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1. Background of the workshop
Most of the papers in this special issue of Studia Philosophica Estonica are
based on the presentations at the international workshop “Practical Realism
—Towards a Realistic Account of Science” held at the University of Tartu,
15-17 June, 2011.e workshop was organised by the Chair of Philosophy of
Science in the framework of a research project supported by the Estonian
Science Foundation’s grant-system (grant no 7946, 2009-2012, grant holder,
Professor Rein Vihalemm). e grant-project entitled “Constructive real-
ism in the conception ofmodels-based scientic theory” initially tackled the
concept of scientic theory and models in the new situation of contempo-
rary philosophy of science, which can be characterised by the focus shiing
away from the theory because it has been recognised as an unjustiably nar-
row orientation on theoretical physics only, at the same time neglecting the
research of a more general issue of “how science actually works”. As a result
of our research, we suggest a solution to the problemvia developing a version
ofmodel-based constructive realismwe call practical realismwhich exhibits
clear advantages over other constructivist approaches, especially over con-
structive empiricism and “radical” social constructivism. For the dierent
members of our research group, the specic research areas have been diverse
extending from physics (two theoretical physicists have been participating
in our team) and chemistry to social researches and humanities.
In our previous publications we have shown that for understanding the
real practice of science, it is appropriate to adopt practical realism as the
philosophical point of departure. Practical realism has been characterised
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and analysed in its various specic aspects, including an analysis of its his-
torical origins, the accounts of scientic theory and concept in philosophy
of chemistry, the issue of monism and pluralism for understanding science,
the problem of laws of nature in non-classical science, the Kuhnian con-
ception of science, the theoretical issues related to the Sociology of Scien-
tic Knowledge (SSK), the problems related to measurement practices, crit-
icism of standard empiricism based on history of scientic practice, etc.
rough participation in the international co-operation projects, some em-
pirical studies of science as practice have been undertaken. For instance, in
the EU 6th framework programme project UPGEM, the workplace cultures
and the institutional dynamics of Estonian physics research units have been
explored. Specically, the aim was to explain how the inclusion and exclu-
sion mechanisms of ideas, people and working styles are culturally formed
and how this is relevant for the philosophical analysis of the objectivity stan-
dards of scientic knowledge.1
At our university, the philosophy of science research group consists
mainly of philosophers with a background in science. We have been inves-
tigating several philosophical issues of scientic practices for many years.
However, it was the rst time we organised an international workshop ded-
icated specically to the theoretical view we call practical realism. Our in-
tention was to discuss the philosophical background of our approach and
some preliminary results of the research project with a broader circle of
philosophers who are holding and developing an account of science as prac-
tice. While until the last decades of the 20th century only few philosophers
paid attention to the actual history of science, and even less to the particu-
lar practical experimental settings or cultural contexts, by now, the situation
has radically changed due to the naturalist and practical turn in philosophy.
e empirical aspects of the development and functioning of science have
been increasingly taken into account in philosophy of science, as well as in
other areas of philosophy. Philosophy has given up its previously superior
position and become a true ally to all academic disciplines. Since practical
realism as a position involves both questions of theoretical and empirical sig-
nicance, theoretical as well as empirical papers analysing scientic practice
were welcomed to the workshop.
2. What is practical realism?
When inviting colleagues to theworkshopwe characterised our viewof prac-
tical realism by reference to ve main theses of practical realism:2
1 See (Lõhkivi 2011), (Velbaum et al. 2008).
2 See (Vihalemm 2005, 180–181), (Vihalemm 2011a, 104), (Vihalemm 2011b, 48).
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1. Science does not represent the world “as it really is” from a god’s-eye
point of view. Naïve realism andmetaphysical realism have assumed the god’s-
eye point of view, or the possibility of one-to-one representation of reality, as
an ideal to be pursued in scientic theories, or even as a true picture in the
sciences.
Representationalism, however, is a tricky view since we lack indepen-
dent criteria for judging the accuracy of a representation. Either external
criteria or additional assumptions are needed, which makes the view im-
plausible.
2. e fact that the world is not accessible independently of scientic the-
ories—or, to be more precise, paradigms (practices)—does not mean that Put-
nam’s internal realism or “radical” social constructivism is acceptable.
In his work Reason, Truth, and History (1981), Putnam suggested that in
the sciences we actually address reality via our internal conceptual schemes.
Radical social constructivism suggests that scientic objects are socially con-
structed and do not exist independently of the construction.
Both of these views are controversial. Internal realism is inconsistent in
the sense that it is not realism of any kind, although the title presumes that,
and social constructivism in this radical form appears to be self-refuting,
since social constructivist views are constructions as well. On the practical
level, the radical social constructivist view contradicts common sense—one
simply cannot do anything one wants to, as reality resists.
3. eoretical activity is only one aspect of science; scientic research is a
practical activity and its main form is the scientic experiment that takes place
in the real world, being a purposeful and critical theory-guided constructive,
as well as a manipulative, material interference with nature.
us, from the practical realist perspective practice is not inferior to the-
ory, theories are construed as sets of models, and model construction is a
natural part of research practices.
4. Science as practice is also a social-historical activity, which means,
amongst other things, that scientic practice includes a normative aspect, too.
at means, in turn, that the world, as it is accessible to science, is not free of
norms either.
erefore, according to this view, it is justied to study the researchers’
identities, division of labour, organisation of work and relations within the
wider cultural contexts.
5. ough neither naïve nor metaphysical, it is certainly realism, as it
claims that what is “given” in the form of scientic practice is an aspect of the
real world. Or, perhaps more precisely, science as practice is a way in which we
are engaged with the world.
is is the way Joseph Rouse (1987) has proposed to interpret omas
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S. Kuhn’s concept of paradigm: through paradigms we are in touch with the
world.
All papers presented at the workshop addressed these theses in one or
another way.
3. e Contributors
To the workshop we invited philosophers who have been contributing to the
philosophy of science in practice. As one of our keynote speakers, we invited
an outstanding author in the naturalised approach, Professor Joseph Rouse
from Wesleyan University, CT, USA, the author of How Scientic Practices
Matter: Reclaiming Philosophical Naturalism (2002); Engaging Science: How
to Understand its Practices Philosophically (1996); andKnowledge and Power:
Towards a Political Philosophy of Science (1987). His talk at ourworkshopwas
titled as “Articulating the World: Conceptual Understanding and the Scien-
tic Image”. A paper based on this talk is forthcoming as “Articulating the
World: Experimental Practice and Conceptual Understanding,” in Isabelle
Peschard and Bas van Fraassen (eds.), e Experimental Side of Modeling,
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
e other keynote speaker was Professor Rom Harré from Georgetown
University, USA, and the Oxford Linacre College, and the Centre for Phi-
losophy of Natural and Social Science, LSE, UK. Author of more than thirty
books, Harré has been studying, amongst other topics, the cultural aspects of
science, emphasising that it is not theories but scientists who refer to scien-
tic objects. Interestingly, Harré has found inspiration in the idea of Umwelt
developed by the Baltic German biologist and alumnus of the University of
Tartu (then Dorpat), Jakob von Uexküll. According to Harré, we should in-
terpret scientists’ activities via their life-world or Umwelt. is, of course,
applies to all human activities, and it is particularly interesting to see how
the sciences, in their turn, inuence our Umwelt.
We were also very glad to host other guest speakers: Hanne Andersen
from Aarhus University in Denmark; Sami Pihlström from the Universi-
ties of Helsinki and Jyväskylä, Finland; Rafaela Hillerbrand from RWTH
Aachen, Germany; Peeter Müürsepp from Tallinn University of Technol-
ogy; Jean-Pierre Llored from CREA/Ecole Polytechnique, France; and Eval-
das Juozelis fromMykolas Romeris University in Vilnius, Lithuania.
On the part of the organisers, Rein Vihalemm, Endla Lõhkivi together
with her PhD studentsKatrinVelbaumand JaanaEigi, AveMets andMichiru
Nagatsu gave a talk. It is worth noting that as the practice turn in philoso-
phy of science can be and has been associated withomas S. Kuhn’s name,
several contributors to the workshop (Hanne Andersen, Joseph Rouse, Sami
Pihlström, Rein Vihalemm) reected upon his views in their presentations.
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Another interesting feature of the workshop was chemistry as a subject mat-
ter providing good examples for the analysis of the practical nature of science
—as it was emphasised by R. Vihalemm—thus it would not come as a sur-
prise that several participants have a background in chemistry or some con-
nections with it: Jean-Pierre Llored is a chemist who has become a philoso-
pher of science; the authors of this foreword - Rein Vihalemm and Endla
Lõhkivi have their rst degrees in chemistry; Rom Harré is among other
things interested in philosophy of chemistry and he is the honorary Pres-
ident of the International Society for the Philosophy of Chemistry. Also,
Peeter Müürsepp, whose background is in mathematics, has written on phi-
losophy of chemistry; and Sami Pihlström, whose main interest is pragma-
tism, is also contributing to the book edited by Jean-Pierre Llored on philos-
ophy of chemistry. But, in connection to pragmatism, it deserves to bemen-
tioned that its founder Charles Sanders Peirce had a background in chem-
istry.
At theworkshop,manynovel theoretical approaches and interesting case
studies were presented, the discussions were highly inspiring and interest-
ing.e feedback from the participants has been very positive and strongly
encouraging for future research on the topic. Most of the papers presented at
the workshop have been revised in the light of the discussion and the referee
comments, and are now published in this volume. We would like to thank
all the authors and referees for their excellent work.
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